

# **CS 4910: Into to Computer Security**

Cryptographic Tools II

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# Updates

- Assignment 1 due 2/12
- Project 1 due 2/24

# Symmetric Key Cryptography


- So far we've covered:
  - what secure symmetric encryption is
  - high-level design of stream ciphers
  - high-level design of block ciphers
  - DES
  - AES
- Next, we'll talk about:
  - **block** cipher encryption modes and limitations
  - Public Key Cryptography

# Block Cipher Modes

- Encryption modes indicate how messages longer than one block are encrypted and decrypted
- **4 modes** of operation were standardized in 1980 for Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
  - electronic codebook mode (**ECB**), cipher feedback mode (**CFB**), cipher block chaining mode (**CBC**), and output feedback mode (**OFB**)
- **5 modes** were specified with the current standard Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001
  - the 4 above and counter mode (**CTR**)

# Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode

- Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode
  - divide the message  $m$  into blocks  $m_1 m_2 \dots m_\ell$  of size  $n$  each
  - encrypt each block separately: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $c_i = E_k(m_i)$ , where  $E$  denotes block cipher encryption
  - the resulting ciphertext is  $c = c_1 c_2 \dots c_\ell$



# Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode

- Properties of ECB mode:
  - identical plaintext blocks result in identical ciphertexts (under the same key)
  - each block can be encrypted and decrypted **independently**
  - this mode doesn't result in secure encryption
- **ECB** mode is a plain invocation of the block cipher
  - it allows the block cipher to be used in other, more complex
  - cryptographic constructions

# Strengths and Weaknesses of ECB

- Strengths:


- Is very simple
- Allows for **parallel** encryptions of the blocks of a plaintext
- Can tolerate the **loss** or **damage** of a block

- Weakness:

- **Documents** and **images** are not suitable for ECB encryption since **patterns** in the plaintext are repeated in the ciphertext:



(a)





(b)

**Figure 8.6:** How ECB mode can leave identifiable patterns in a sequence of blocks: (a) An image of Tux the penguin, the Linux mascot. (b) An encryption of the Tux image using ECB mode. (The image in (a) is by Larry Ewing, lewing@isc.tamu.edu, using The Gimp; the image in (b) is by Dr. Juzam. Both are used with permission via attribution.)

# Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode

- In Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
  - The previous ciphertext block is **combined** with the current plaintext block  $C[i] = E_K(C[i-1] \oplus P[i])$
  - $C[-1] = V$ , a **random** block separately transmitted encrypted - known as the **Initialization Vector (IV)**
  - Decryption:  $P[i] = C[i-1] \oplus D_K(C[i])$





# Strengths and Weaknesses of CBC

- Strengths:


- Doesn't show patterns in the plaintext
- Is the most common mode

- Weaknesses:

- CBC requires the **reliable** transmission of all the blocks **sequentially**
- CBC is not suitable for applications that **allow packet losses** (e.g., music and video streaming)

# Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode

- The cipher is given as feedback to the next block of encryption with some new specifications
  - First, an initial vector IV is used for encryption and output bits are divided as a set of  $s$  and  $b-s$  bits: **random IV** and set initial input  $I_1 = IV$
  - The left-hand  $s$  bits are selected along with plaintext bits to which an XOR operation is applied
  - The result is given as input to a shift register having  $b-s$  bits to lhs,  $s$  bits to rhs and the process continues
- encryption:  $c_i = E_k(I_i) \oplus m_i; I_{i+1} = C_i$
- decryption:  $m_i = c_i \oplus E_k(I_i)$





# Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode

- This mode allows the block cipher to be used as a **stream cipher**
  - if our application requires that **plaintext units shorter than the block** are transmitted without delay, we can use this mode
  - the message is transmitted in  $r$ -bit units ( $r$  is often 8 or 1)
- Properties of CFB mode:
  - the mode is **CPA-secure** (under the same assumption that the block cipher is strong)
  - similar to CBC, a ciphertext block **depends on all previous plaintext blocks**
  - throughput is decreased when the mode is used on small units
  - one encryption operation is applied per  $r$  bits, not per  $n$  bits

# Output Feedback (OFB) mode

- Similar to CFB, but the **feedback** is from **encryption output** and is independent of the message
- **n-bit** feedback is recommended
- using fewer bits for the feedback reduces the size of the cycle




# Output Feedback (OFB) mode

- Output Feedback (OFB) mode:
  - n-bit feedback is recommended
  - using fewer bits for the feedback reduces the size of the cycle
- Properties of OFB:
  - the mode is CPA-secure
  - the key stream is plaintext-independent
  - similar to CFB, throughput is decreased for  $r < n$ , but the key stream can be precomputed

# Counter (CRT) mode

- a counter is encrypted and XORed with a plaintext block
- no feedback into the encryption function



# Counter (CRT) mode

- Advantages of counter mode
  - Hardware and software efficiency: multiple blocks can be encrypted or decrypted in parallel
  - Preprocessing: encryption can be done in advance; the rest is only XOR
  - Random access: its block of plaintext or ciphertext can be processed independently of others
  - Security: at least as secure as other modes
  - Simplicity: doesn't require decryption or decryption key scheduling
- But what happens **if the counter is reused?**

# Block Cipher Modes of Operation

Mode	Description	Typical Application
Electronic Code book (ECB)	Each block of plaintext bits is encoded independently using the same key.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Secure transmission of single values (e.g., an encryption key)</li> </ul>
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)	The input to the encryption algorithm is the XOR of the next block of plaintext and the preceding block of ciphertext.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General-purpose block-oriented transmission</li> <li>Authentication (CBC-MAC) using last block</li> </ul>
Cipher Feedback (CFB)	Input is processed $s$ bits at a time. Preceding ciphertext is used as input to the encryption algorithm to produce pseudorandom output, which is XORed with plaintext to produce next unit of ciphertext.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General-purpose stream-oriented transmission</li> <li>Authentication</li> </ul>
Output Feedback (OFB)	Similar to CFB, except that the input to the encryption algorithm is the preceding pseudorandom output.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stream-oriented transmission over noisy channel (e.g., satellite communication)</li> </ul>
Counter (CTR)	Each block of plaintext is XORed with an encrypted counter. The counter is incremented for each subsequent block.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General-purpose block-oriented transmission</li> <li>Useful for high-speed requirements</li> </ul>



# Block Cipher Modes of Operation

Mode	Description	Typical Application
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)	A variation of CBC-MAC mode that adjusts the final message block for greater security before using it to create the final block which is the authentication code.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Authentication</li></ul>
Offset Codebook (OCB)	Each block of plaintext is XORed with a unique offset before encryption, and an encrypted authentication code is generated.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Authenticated Encryption on a Stream</li></ul>
Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CCM)	Provide both confidentiality and the authentication by combining Counter (CTR) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC-MAC) modes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Authenticated Encryption where the data is available in advance</li></ul>
Galois Counter Mode (GCM)	Provide both confidentiality and the authentication by combining Counter (CTR) mode with a Galois polynomial MAC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Authenticated Encryption on a Stream</li></ul>

# Symmetric Key Cryptography

- **Advantages**

- Secure, hard to break
  - Offers good confidentiality
- Fast
  - Many rounds of substitution and transposition
  - Even faster with direct hardware support

- **Disadvantage**

- The secret key is to be transmitted to the receiving system before the actual message is to be transmitted

# Summary for Symmetric Key Cryptography

- **AES** is the current block cipher standard
  - it offers strong security and fast performance
- Five **encryption modes** are specified as part of the standard
  - ECB mode is not for secure encryption
  - any other encryption mode achieves sufficient security
    - use one of these modes for encryption even if the message is a single block
- **Strong randomness** is required for cryptographic purposes
  - key generation, IV generation, etc.

# Summary for Symmetric Key Cryptography

- Symmetric encryption principles
  - Cryptography
  - Cryptanalysis
- Data encryption standard (DES)
  - Data encryption standard
  - Triple DES
- Advanced encryption standard (AES)
  - Overview of the algorithm
  - Algorithm details
- Stream ciphers and RC4
  - Stream cipher structure
  - RC4 stream cipher
  - ChaCha20 stream cipher
- Cipher block modes of operation
  - Electronic codebook mode
  - Cipher block chaining mode
  - Cipher feedback mode
  - Counter mode
- Key distribution

# What we already know

- Symmetric cryptography tools
  - Stream cipher
  - Block cipher
  - DES, AES
  - Block cipher modes

# Next

Cryptographic tools

- Overview
- Symmetric Key Cryptography
- Public Key Cryptography
- Message Integrity and Digital Signatures
- Summary

# Public-Key Cryptography

- **Public-key encryption**
  - a party creates a **public-private key pair**
    - the public key is  $pk$
    - the private or secret key is  $sk$
- the public key is used for encryption and is publicly available
- the private key is used for decryption only  $Dec_{sk}(Enc_{pk}(m)) = m$
- knowing the public key and the encryption algorithm only, it is computationally infeasible to find the secret key
- public-key crypto systems are also called **asymmetric**

# Symmetric vs Public Key Cryptography

## Symmetric key crypto

- requires sender, receiver know **shared** secret key
- Q: how to **agree on** key in first place (particularly if never “**met**”)?
  - Challenging for **Distributed** systems


## Public key cryptography

- ❑ radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- ❑ sender, receiver do *not* **share** secret key
- ❑ *public* encryption key known to *all*
- ❑ *private* decryption key known **only** to receiver





# Public Key Cryptography



# Public Key Encryption Algorithms

Requirements:

1. need  $\text{Enc}_{pk}(\cdot)$  and  $\text{Dec}_{sk}(\cdot)$  such that
  - $\text{Dec}_{sk}(\text{Enc}_{pk}(m)) = m$
2. given public key  $K_{pk}$  , it should be **impossible** to compute private key  $K_{sk}$

**RSA:** Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

# Applications for Public-Key Cryptosystems

Algorithm	Digital Signature	Symmetric Key Distribution	Encryption of Secret Keys
RSA	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diffie–Hellman	No	Yes	No
DSS	Yes	No	No
Elliptic Curve	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms (1 of 2)

- RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
  - Developed in 1977
  - Most widely accepted and implemented approach to public-key encryption
  - Block cipher in which the plaintext and ciphertext are integers between 0 and  $n-1$  for some  $n$ .
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm
  - Enables two users to securely reach agreement about a shared secret that can be used as a secret key for subsequent symmetric encryption of messages
  - Limited to the exchange of the keys

# Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms (2 of 2)

- Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
  - Provides only a digital signature function with SHA-1
  - Cannot be used for encryption or key exchange
- Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
  - Security like RSA, but with much smaller keys

# Public Key Encryption

- Almost all public-key encryption algorithms use **number theory and modular arithmetic**
  - **RSA** is based on the hardness of factoring large numbers
  - **ElGamal** (based on Diffie-hellman key exchange) is based on the hardness of solving discrete logarithm problem
- **RSA is the most commonly used public-key encryption algorithm** invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1978
  - sustained many years of attacks on it
  - relies on the fact that **factoring large numbers is hard**
    - let  $n = pq$ , where  $p$  and  $q$  are large primes
    - given only  $n$ , it is hard to find  $p$  or  $q$ , which are used as a trapdoor

## RSA: another important property

- The following property will be *very* useful:

$$\text{Dec}_{sk}(\text{Enc}_{pk}(m)) = m = \text{Enc}_{pk}(\text{Dec}_{sk}(m))$$

use public key  
first, followed by  
private key

use private key  
first, followed by  
public key

***Result is the same!***

# RSA Public-Key Encryption

- Uses exponentiation of integers modulo a prime
- RSA key generation
  - generate two large prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$  of the same length
  - Compute  $n = pq$
  - Choose a small prime number  $e$
  - Compute the smallest  $d$  such that  $ed \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
- public key  $PU = \{e, n\}$
- private key  $PR = \{d, n\}$



# RSA Public-Key Encryption

- Both sender and receiver know values of  $n$  and  $e$
- Only receiver knows value of  $d$
- Encryption:
  - given a message  $m$  such that  $0 < m < n$
  - given a public key  $pk = (e, n)$
  - Encrypt as  $C = Enc_{pk}(m) = m^e \bmod n$
- Decryption:
  - given a ciphertext  $c$  ( $0 < c < n$ )
  - given a public key  $pk = (e, n)$  and the corresponding private key  $sk = d$
  - Decrypt as  $m = Dec_{sk}(c) = c^d \bmod n = (m^e)^d \bmod n = m$

# Plain RSA Encryption

- Example of Plain RSA
  - key generation
    - $p = 11, q = 7, n = pq = 77, \phi(n) = 60$
    - $e = 37 \Rightarrow d = 13$  (i.e.,  $ed = 481; ed \bmod 60 = 1$ )
    - public key is  $pk = (37, 77)$  and private key is  $sk = 13$
  - Encryption
    - let  $m = 15$
    - $c = \text{Enc}(m) = m^e \bmod n = 15^{37} \bmod 77 = 71$
  - Decryption
    - $m = \text{Dec}(c) = c^d \bmod n = 71^{13} \bmod 77 = 15$

# Security of RSA

## Existing attacks on RSA:



### Brute force

Involves trying all possible private keys




### Mathematical attacks

There are several approaches, all equivalent in effort to factoring the product of two primes



### Timing attacks

These depend on the running time of the decryption algorithm



### Chosen ciphertext attacks

This type of attack exploits properties of the R S A algorithm

# Timing Attack Countermeasures

- **Constant exponentiation time**
  - Ensure that all exponentiations take the same amount of time before returning a result
  - This is a simple fix but does degrade performance
- **Random delay**
  - Better performance could be achieved by adding a random delay to the exponentiation algorithm to confuse the timing attack
  - If defenders do not add enough noise, attackers could still succeed by collecting additional measurements to compensate for the random delays
- **Blinding**
  - Multiply the ciphertext by a random number before performing exponentiation
  - This process prevents the attacker from knowing what ciphertext bits are being processed inside the computer and, therefore, prevents the bit-by-bit analysis essential to the timing attack

# Towards Safe Use of RSA

- Padded RSA

- plain RSA is deterministic
- this is even worse than in case of symmetric encryption
  - anyone can search for  $m$  encrypting various messages
- we can **randomize ciphertext by padding** each  $m$  with random bits
  - now a message can be at most  $k - t$  bits long
  - random  $t$  bits are added to it such that  $2^t$  work is infeasible

# Towards Safe Use of RSA

- **PKCS #1 v1.5** was a widely used standard for padded RSA
  - PKCS = RSA Laboratories Public-Key Cryptography Standard
  - it is believed to be CPA-secure
- **PKCS #1 v2.0** utilizes OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)
  - the newer version mitigates some attacks on v1.5 and is known to be CCA-secure
  - in OAEP, we use plain RSA encryption on  $m \oplus g(r) || r \oplus h(m \oplus g(r))$ , where  $h$  and  $g$  are hash functions and  $r$  is randomness

# Towards Safe Use of RSA

- Making factoring infeasible
  - choose  $n$  to be long enough (we can choose any  $n$ !)
  - for a security parameter  $k$ , compute  $n$  with  $|n| = k$
- A good implementation will also have countermeasures against **implementation-level attacks**
  - timing attacks, special cases of  $e$  and  $d$ , etc.

# Symmetric vs Public-Key Encryption

- Public-key operations are orders of magnitude **slower than** symmetric encryption
  - a multiplication modulo  $n$  requires close to  $O(|n|^2)$  work
  - a full-size exponentiation modulo  $n$  requires close to  $O(|n|^3)$  work
    - it is the cost of multiplication times the exponent size
  - public-key encryption is typically not used to communicate large volumes of data
    - it is rather used to communicate (or agree on) a symmetric key
    - the data itself is sent encrypted with the symmetric key
- In RSA, decryption is significantly slower than encryption, with key generation being the slowest



# Next

Cryptographic tools

- Overview
- Symmetric Key Cryptography
- Public Key Cryptography
  - Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
- Message Integrity and Digital Signatures
- Summary